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COMPENSATION REFORM, ACCIDENT COSTS, AND TRAFFIC
SAFETY: TOWARD A UNIFIED MOTOR TRANSPORT POLICY
PHILIP

C. THORPEt

The decade of the 1960's will be regarded by future historians as
marking a watershed in the efforts of American society to come to terms
with the automobile. During that decade, federal, state and local governments committed themselves to programs of highway improvement,
expressway construction, and the substantial completion of the. network
of interstate highways.' In 1966 Congress created the Department of
Transportation, with responsibilities for developing national transportation policies.2 Largely as a result of the impact of one book, Unsafe at
Any Speed,3 legislation establishing national safety standards for motor
vehicles and vehicular equipment was approved." Traffic safety research
was being conducted on a scale previously unknown.5 State governments
were also active in the 1960's, regulating vehicle safety through annual
inspection laws,6 and in a few instances enforcing safety standards for
vehicles and equpipment.' By the end of the decade, efforts were underway to reduce air pollution resulting from the use of the internal combustion engine.8 The automotive and petroleum industries had by 1970
announced programs to combat air pollution and to produce safer cars.9
Although the social problems created or compounded by the motor
vehicle were not solved by the beginning of 1970, a historian could view
the decade as one in which the United States became serious about them
and began substantial efforts to find and apply correctives.
t
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1.
2.
3.
4.

Federal-aid Highways, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-34 (1964).
Department of Transportation, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651-59 (Supp. V, 1970).
R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965) [hereinafter cited as NADER].
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1425 (Supp. V, 1970).

5. See, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, 1969 REPORT ON ACTIVITIES UNDER THE NATIONAL TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY ACT 46 (1970).
6. See, R. GOODMAN, AUTOMOBILE DESIGN LIABILITY (1970) at ch. 9 [hereinafter
cited as GOODMAN].
7. See, e.g., N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFIc LAW §§ 382-84 (McKinney 1970).
8. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 27, 1969, at 42, col. 3; id. Aug. 27, 1969, at 1, col. 4.
9. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 4, 1964, at 94, col. 5; id. Sept. 7, 1969, at 84, col. 5.
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There was one notable exception to this pattern of effective societal
response to the problems created by the automobile. Little progress
was made toward achieving a reform of the methods used to provide
compensation for losses suffered by the victims of motor vehicle accidents.
This inaction was not due to a lack of interest in or indifference to reform.
By the mid-1960's several studies of the deficiencies of the current compensation system had been published,"0 and a number of alternatives to
the law of torts as a compensation system had been proposed." One
proposal, the Keeton-O'Connell Plan," had generated literature sufficient
to fill a good sized book shelf." By 1970 elements within the insurance
industry had recommended a non-fault compensation system 4 and the
6
insurance commissioners of two states, New York" and Connecticut,"
had proposed plans for altering the traditional compensation system. The
Department of Transportation was making an extensive study of the
problem but by 1970 had made no recommendations.' 7 Puerto Rico alone
had adopted a non-fault plan by 1970,18 and the iVassachusetts general
assembly passed a minimum "no-fault" plan in the same year." Despite
the attention given to reform during those years, the situation in 1970
was not much different than it had been a decade before.
Several hypotheses might explain this nation's failure to accept
non-fault motor vehicle accident compensation. The first places the blame
10. R.

J. O'CoNNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
as KEETON & O'CONNELLI ; A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT,
BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS (1964)

KEETON

&

(1965) [hereinafter cited
JR,

C.

VOLTZ,

&

[hereinafter cited as CONARD];

W.

BLUM &

H.

KALVEN, JR., PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES

ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM (1964) [hereinafter cited as BLUM & KALVENJ.
11. A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951) [hereinafter cited as
EHRENZWEIG] ; L. GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958) [hereinafter cited as GREEN].
12. See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10.

13. See, e.g., Hold, Critique of Basic Protectionfor the Traffic Victim-The KeetonO'Connell Proposal, 1968 INS. L.J. 73 (1968) ; Jung, The Keeton-O'Connell Plan-How
Maity People Know What It Isr, 1968 INS. L.J. 606 (1968) ; Markhoff, Compensation
Without Fault and the Keeton-O'Connell Plan: A Critique, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 175
(1968) ; Maryott, Tort System and Auto Claims: Evaluating the Keeton-O'Connell Proposal, 53 A.B.A.J. 639 (1968).
14. AMERICAN INSURANCE ASS'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND
EVALUATE THE KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
REPARATIONS (1968) [hereinafter cited as A IA].
15. STATE OF NEW YORK INSURANCE DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE . . . FOR
WHOSE BENEFIT?

(1970)

[hereinafter cited as New York Plant].

16.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT INSURANCE DEP'T, A PROGRAM FOR AUTOMOBILE INSUR-

18.

P.R. ANN. LAWS tit. 9, §§ 2051-65 (Vol. 2A Cum. Pocket Supp., 1969).

ANCE AND ACCIDENT BENEFITS REFORM (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cotter].
17. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION
STUDY (1970) [hereinafter cited as D.O.T. Studies].

19. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 17, 1970, at 6, col. 1.
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with attorneys and insurance companies.2" Underwriting liability insurance is too lucrative to be abandoned, and a substantial number of
attorneys earn too much money from automobile accident litigation to
permit adoption of a non-fault system. This explanation does not take
into account the fact that neither the bar nor the insurance industry have
been of one accord about non-fault compensation plans. Advocates for
reform can be found among practicing attorneys2 as well as among legal
scholars. 2 The American Insurance Association has prepared a nonfault plan,2" and the industry as a whole has advocated or accepted
many state-instituted reforms leading toward non-fault compensation.2"
The opposition to reform is not monolithic, nor has it operated in a
secretive fashion. It is, therefore, not possible to credit such opposition
as the sole explanation for the lack of acceptance of compensation reform,
but at best only a partial one.
The second explanation is that the time for reform is only now
arriving. Political, economic and social factors have at last combined
to permit reform in the near future, as evidenced by the success in
Puerto Rico, 25 the adoption of a limited non-fault plan in Massachusetts, 20 the D.O.T. study"1 and the research described earlier. 28 This does
not, however, explain the general lack of acceptance of non-fault compensation. A non-fault compensation plan is not a radical departure for a
nation which has accepted workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation, social security and the War on Poverty. The battles for
Medicare and Medicaid though long, were begun and won after World
War 11.21 In contrast, the first non-fault compensation proposal, the
Columbia Plan" was published in 1934. By the mid-1960's several
variations3 ' had been designed but not adopted. Non-fault compensation
reform is old. Its failure cannot be explained as a lack of interest, since
the American public has been concerned about traffic problems for some
20. Buckley, Syndicated column Nov. 5, 1970.
21. J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM 70-85 (1969).
22. For many years many of the most eminent scholars in the field of torts have
advocated non-fault compensation for motor vehicle accident victims. Among such advocates, one can name Deans Prosser and Green and Profs. Ehrenzweig, Keeton, Franklin, James and Morris.
23. See generally AIA, szpra note 14.
24. See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 109-23.
25. See note 18 supra.
26. See note 19 supra.
27. See generally D.O.T. Studies, supra note 17.
28. See notes 21, 22 and 23 supra.
29. See, e.g., Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety, supra note 4.
30.

See note 5 supra.

31. See, e.g.,

KEETON & O'CoNNELL,

supra note 10, at 109-14.
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time. It has demanded and obtained vehicular safety regulation" in a
decade. 3 The demand for safer highways and the acceptance of large
expenditures of tax funds to achieve them, 4 was translated into action
during the 1950's." Concern over compensating accident victims rose
sharply after World War II, and insureds have voluntarily assumed the
increased premium costs of expanded insurance coverages and those
non-fault coverages offered to them. 6 The political, economic and social
factors necessary for achieving reform have been present for some time;
yet, motor vehicle accident compensation remains unaltered.
The call for reform is an old one. Its age and the absence of its
success suggest the desirability of re-evaluating non-fault motor vehicle
accident compensation systems. For some reason reform is not adequately
responsive to the various social concerns which must be reflected in
selecting an appropriate method for compensating the victims of motoring
accidents. The general agreement in approach among the various proposals eliminates the possibility that reform has failed for lack of a
solution.37 Hence reform, though representing an improvement of some
facets of the problem, must also involve certain disadvantages so serious
in nature that political judgment rejects reform as it is currently being
proposed.
In this regard it is instructive to look at the recent experience in
Massachusetts. Massachusetts became the first state to adopt some form
of non-fault compensation when the General Assembly enacted a limited
plan in August, 1970."s The plan as adopted provided for a rate reduction
of 15%o' on the various coverages required. 3 Several insurers threatened
to stop writing insurance coverages within the state because they believed
the rate reductions enacted would make it uneconomical to continue to
do so.40 Insurers obtained judicial review, and the Massachusetts Supreme
Court declared the rate reduction for property damage coverages un32. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1425 (1970).
33. See generally NADER, supra note 3; R. GOODMAN, AUTOmOBILE DESIGN LIABILITY (1970) at ch. 5 and Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety, supra note 4.
34. See note 5 supra.
35. See generally 23 U.S.C. §§ 104-36 (1964).
36. Health Insurance for the Aged, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-96 (Supp. V, 1970).
37. Cf. the provisions of KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 10; New York Plan.,
supra note 15; AIA, supra note 14.
38. See note 19 supra.

39. Id.
40. Id.
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constitutional in November, 1970.4 According to newspaper reports several
insurers, though applauding this action, were withholding decision about
continuing to write policies in Massachusetts until all questions about
rates were resolved. 2 Nevertheless, the state's insurance commissioner
announced that rate reductions would be effectuated." It was thought
that his plan would involve a reduction in coverage, probably by raising
the limits of a deductible or self-insurance provision.4 These difficulties
are particularly noteworthy since Massachusetts has for many years
compelled the purchase of liability insurance.45 Therefore, insurer opposition cannot be attributed to the long-standing industry opposition to
compulsory insurance."'
The Massachusetts experience reveals that the unsolved problem
facing the non-fault motor vehicle accident plans-the problem which
must be solved before major reform in the current compensation system
can be achieved-is one of cost. The costs of accidents are too high;
hence the cost to the motoring public is too high. The insurance industry
has in recent years come under increasing criticism from government and
consumer groups17 complaining about the high premium cost of liability
insurance, the rating practices of the industry, the difficulties many
persons have in obtaining liability insurance, and the cancellation practices
prevalent in the industry. Putting aside for the present the legitimacy
of these criticisms, it is interesting to note that they are directed at the
cost of liability insurance to users and at the manner in which the industry
administers the funds provided for victim compensation. Although the
industry is the target, insurers in turn complain that high accident costs
necessitate either higher premium charges for liability insurance or strict
underwriting practices eliminating high risk drivers. 49 The dilemma is
obvious. If victims of motoring accidents are to be compensated, funds
must be provided. These funds at present are provided by motor vehicle
users who insure. The user group believes that its cost absorbing capacities have been reached. Rising accident rates and the inflationary
economic trend of the past decades have increased the demand for bene41.

(1970).
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
and 90th
48.
49.

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Conm'r of Ins., -

Mass. -

, 263 N.E.2d 698

See note 19 supra.
Id.
Id.
MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 90, §§ 34A-K (1967).
See KEEToN & O'CoNNnL, supra note 10, at 86-102.
Senate Subcomm on Anti-Trust and Monopoly, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965),
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hart Subcomm.].
Id.
Id.
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fits. What emerges is a serious question of national policy. Unfortunately,
the debate over motor vehicle accident compensation reform proposals
have largely ignored this critical question of the cost to motorists of
providing victim compensation.
The Non-Fault Plaitsand The FundingSources
of Motor Accident Benefits
Someone designing a compensation plan would need to consider
three matters: the coverages to be provided, the funding of the coverages
and the apparatus for administering the plan. The various plans for nonfault motor vehicle accident compensation, although varying in detail,
are similar in design. Most would eliminate the liability limitations
imposed by the common law action of negligence.5" Most would fund
the resulting coverage expansion through the purchase of insurance by
motor vehicle users." Most would vest administration of compensation in
the private insurance industry.5" These plans may be characterized as
little more than devices to legitimize the motor vehicle accident compensation system which has already evolved. 5" The plans would provide
compensation to a greater number of victims than are now covered,"
thereby eliminating many inequities in coverage resulting from the
application of tort law doctrines,5 5 and permitting a more efficient
administration of the system.5" These benefits or improvements, however, are the only major alterations in current practices anticipated from
adopting a non-fault compensation plan. To the extent that such plans
retain the motorist as the primary funding source, and the private
insurance industry as the agency for claims administration, they will not
correct defects in these aspects of the design.
At present, administration of claims arising from motor vehicle
accidents rests primarily with liability insurers, with what is essentially
a right of appeal to the judicial system if the settlement proposed by the
insurer does not satisfy the claimant. Studies of the administration of
these claims reveal that judicial intervention into the processing of claims
50.
15; and
51.
15; and
52.
15; and
53.
54.
55.

See generally KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10; New York Plai. supra note
AIA, supra note 14.
See genwrally KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10; New York Plan, supra note
AIA, supra note 14.
See generally KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10; New York Plai, supra note
AIA, supra note 14.
See, e.g., KEErON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 71-119.
See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 515-18.
Id.

56. Id.

UNIFORM MOTOR TRANSPORT POLICY

307

is rare. 7 But, the impact of the right to a judicial determination of the
claim is far greater than this would indicate because legal standards are
probably used by insurers in settling with claimants informally. Although
it is not certain how carefully insurers apply legal doctrines, it can be
stated safely that there is a reasonably close relationship between court
applied rules of law and the settlement practices of insurers.5" Ultimately,
court applied rules will govern the resolution of the claim if the informal
adjustment process fails. Under most non-fault plans, the insurance industry is retained to administer claims: either they propose to rely upon
the present system of informal insurer-claimant adjustment processing
with ultimate judicial intervention when necessary, 9 or they propose a
system whereby the possibility -of judicial intervention is greatly
reduced.6" This latter proposal rests on the reasonable assumption that by
decreasing the number of litagible issues, resort to the courts will in turn
be diminished. However, basic reliance upon insurers as the primary
claims administrative agency is not altered. Slight alteration of the traditional role of the insurer is sensible because insurers as a group are
already equipped to process the volume of claims being generated by motor
vehicle accidents. It is expedient to continue their role. Furthermore the
political difficulties that would be encountered were a plan to propose the
elimination of or substantial reduction in the role of the private insurance
industry with respect to motor vehicle accident claims are avoided. Thus,
it is possible to exclude the retention of insurer administration as a likely
source of defects in non-fault plans.
The benefits to be provided under most plans have been criticized
since negligent victims would receive compensation. However, the adantages of expanding coverage to this group so far outweigh the disadvantages, the case for this reform becomes almost irresistible. Empirical studies of the present system establish that it is an expensive,
inefficient method for providing compensation. 6 Administrative costs
are very high62 in comparison to the administrative costs under nonfault compensation systems." Although the savings to be realized from a
non-fault benefits plan can only be estimated, there is every reason to
believe that they would be substantial. 4 The costs of investigating and
57. See CoNAIW, supra note 10, at 3.
58. See CONARD, supra note 10, at 209-21.
59. See EHRENZWEIG, supra note 11 and Cotter, supro note 16.
60. See New York Plan, supra note 15; AIA, supra note 14; and
NELL, supra note 10.
61.

See CoNARD, supra note 10.

62. Id.

63. Id.
64. See

KEEToN & O'CoNNELL,

supra note 10, at 515-18.

KEOEToN

& O'CoN-
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processing claims should decline by reducing the number of decisions
necessary to determine coverage.6" Litigation expenses should be reduced
for the same reason.6" Undoubtedly a non-fault benefit plan would increase
the number of victims compensated.67 So long as this coverage expansion
is funded from administrative savings and an expanded funding base
rather than from victims currently being compensated, the expansion of
coverage to additional victims is a rational allocation of resources. 6
Certainly greater efficiencies and savings become strong arguments in
favor of such plans if neither the level of benefits nor the funding groups
are adversely affected. Another efficiency must be counted here: court
time. The demand on court time for motor vehicle accident litigation
reduces the time available for other litigation.6" As most accident litigation involves factual disputes only, and legal principles have long since
been developed and explored, accident litigation involves only the
application of rule to fact. The full panoply of judge, jury and adversaries,
which may have high creative or protective value in other contexts,"0
seems wasted effort in the context of a purely factual dispute: removal of
most accident litigation from the courts would permit a better allocation
of judicial resources. 7
Another reason for adopting some form of non-fault benefit plan is
that it would be more equitable and just than is the current system. Put
simply, most people believe that they should be paid promptly for losses
suffered." They view insurance as a savings fund against the eventuality
of an accident. When an accident occurs, compensation is expected 3 and
when funds are not forthcoming, or when litigation is required, disrespect for the legal system results. 4 The present system is not meeting
people's expectations for prompt payment of claims. Another aspect of
this problem involves the present delay in payment with a consequent
delay in victim rehabilitation. 75 Rehabilitation is successful if begun
65. Id.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Rosenberg and Sovern, Delay and Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 1115 (1959); J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM (1969).
70. See generally H. KALVEN, JR., & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
71. R. HUNTING & G. NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY 8 (1962); R.
KEETON & J. O'CoNNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH:

REFORM

THE NEED FOR LEGAL AND INSURANCE

27-32 (1967).

72. Id.

73. Id.

74. See CONARD, supra note 10, at 81.
75. Rusk, Trauma, Accidents and Rehabilitation, in TRAUMA AND THE AUTOmOBLME
296 (W. Curran & N. Chayet eds. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Curran & Chayet].
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early. By permitting prompt payment of claims, a non-fault plan would
greatly assist rehabilitative efforts and reduce the level of benefits required for victim care.7" Finally, benefits paid on a non-fault basis reduce
the necessity for bargaining over payments to be used to alleviate human
misfortune. Human dignity and respect suffer whenever compromises
77
must be struck.
Despite the advantages in adopting some form of non-fault compensation plan, the costs to motorists remain high. Unfortunately, the
various proposals have not altered substantially the funding of benefits.
Each has allocated the obligation to fund in a somewhat different manner.
All, however, follow similar funding patterns. The first allocative
choice is between user-funding and taxpayer funding. In most plans
vehicle users are the primary funding class, although in one proposal
taxpayer funding is recommended,78 and that choice has been advocated
by others. 79 If user-funding is selected, alternative means for allocating
and distributing this obligation are available. Some plans are voluntary,"0
while others compel the purchase of insurance;8 a choice between
allocating the obligation to all members of the user class, or allocating
responsibility only to those members willing to provide such benefits
plus theose ultimately compelled to do so through the operation of
financial responsibility law.82 There is yet another allocation choice to
make in those plans utilizing user-funding. All costs may be allocated
to the user class, 8 or some of the costs may be shifted to other funding
groups. In general, if some costs are allocated elsewhere, this has been
accomplished by providing that the plan's coverages be excess to all
other benefits to which the victim is entitled.84 Finally, a distributive choice must be made among first person or loss insurance; third
person liability insurance; or some combined form of coverage, if user
funding is selected.8" The choice is in essence one of dicating the actuarial
basis for deciding the contribution level demanded from each member
76. See J. FRANx, AMERICAN LAW: TEE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM (1969).
77. See generally KEEoTN & O'CoNxu., supranote 10, at 37-38.

78. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Re-

imbursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Franklin].
79. See BLum &KALVEN, supra note 10.
80. See generally EHRENZWEIG, supra note 10.
81. The Keeton-O'Connell, New York and AIA plans are examples. Most of the
plans have compelled the purchase of insurance coverage.
82. It is fair to assume that the financial responsibility laws would be retained.
83. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 11.
84. See generally KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10 and New York Plan, supra
note 15.
85. The Keeton-O'Connell and New York plans, for example, utilize a combination
coverage.
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of the obliged class. The distributive differences produced may
be small in fact, since most liability insurance premiums are already
calculated on the basis of exposure rather than liability.Y
For the most part, the concept of compensation funding provided by
the users of motor vehicles has been retained in the non-fault plans.
User funding has been retained primarily because motorists are the
traditional funding source and retention is politically the most expedient.
Occasionally, the suggestion has been made that the best method for
funding compensation payments is through some form of tax-supported
system similar to social security. 7 Such suggestions have been rejected
on the ground that the private insurance industry would not countenance
such a step.88 Assuming that a case for a non-fault benefits plan can be
established, the role of private insurance remains unanswered. Theoretically, that role is defined by the type of funding scheme adopted.
As a political matter, a non-fault plan must provide a role for the
insurance industry. This restricts the choice of plans, ruling out any
move to a totally tax-supported plan, for example.89 The role for the
industry in the future need not be its present role, however. Federal
regulatory activity has become likely,9" and one may anticipate that
consumer complaints about insurance will sooner or later produce greater
regulation at either the federal or state level.91 It is fair to assume that
the industry will be forced to "accept" greater regulation than at present
so long as it retains a sufficiently lucrative role in any compensation
system adopted.
Political considerations have thus dictated retention of user funding
for non-fault accident compensation plans, since user funding is compatible with retaining a role for private insurance companies. The unfortunate consequence is that the costs of benefits will continue to be
borne by a group-vehicle users-already complaining about the present
cost burden. This group has become a sufficiently powerful political force
that any reform not providing a substantial premium cost reduction is
probably doomed.92 In several non-fault plans the premium cost problem
has been recognized and various devices have been utilized in an attempt
86. See Auto Rates: The Big Picture, 45 J. AMl. INs. 64 (1969).
87. See BLUMI & KALVEN, supra note 10, at 42-43 and 73-74; Franklin, supra note
79, at 812-14.
88. See, BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 10, at 79-80.
89. Id.
90. See, Hart Subcomnz., suPra note 47.
91. See, BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 10, at 79-80.
92. The recent enactment of a limited non-fault plan in Massachusetts, coupled
with a rate reduction legislatively imposed, is evidence of the increasing pressure for
rating reform.
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to reduce costs to vehicle users. However each device creates problems
about the legitimacy of reallocating accident costs to other benefits
systems, or the efficacy of the device to achieve real savings.
The devices which the non-fault plans have proposed as cost reducers
are: (1) decreases in benefits coverage; (2) savings resulting from
more efficient and economical claims administration and; (3) obtaining
some funding from other sources. Most plans use a combination of
these devices." The first, reduction of coverage, might be accomplished
in two ways: by providing maximum coverage limits and by making the
coverage excess to other available benefits such as health and accident
insurance or workmen's compensation benefits. 4 This approach to cost
reduction, undoubtedly an effective one, raises serious questions as to
the justification therefor. Some costs of traffic accidents would be
absorbed by activities not causally responsible for such accidents. This is
a misallocation of costs,9 rationalized because other benefits plans are
more efficient loss spreading devices than is liability insurance. 6 Furthermore coverage reductions or the maintenance of current maximum
coverage limits in a period of inflation effectively forces victims to
absorb an increasing amount of real accident costs. This choice may
also be rationalized as economically more efficient. However, the real
social cost of motoring becomes hidden.
Studies have established that the second cost reducing alternative,
increasing the internal efficiency of the compensation system to provide
more money for paying benefits, is likely to result if a non-fault plan is
adopted.9 7 The current system is very inefficient, consuming approximately half of every premium dollar in overhead, administrative and
litigation expense.9 Proponents argue that their plans would effectuate
substantial administrative savings, 9 thus reducing premium rates.'
The studies of the economics of motor vehicle accident compensation
have compared the administrative costs of similar systems such as
health and accident insurance, workmen's compensation, and social
93. The Keeton-O'Connell and New York plans utilize all these devices. Other
proposals utilize combinations thereof.
94. See, e.g., KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 10, at 7-8, and New York Pln,

.mpranote 15, at 83-90.
95. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS oF AccIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcoNoMIC ANALYSIs (1970), esp. ch. 5.
96. See New York Plan, supra note 15, and KEEToN & O'CoNNELL, supra note 10.

97. See KEaTON & O'CoNELL, supra note 10, at 6, and New York Plan, supra note
15, at 106.
98. See CoNARD, supra note 10, at 52-66.
99. See KEEToN & O'CoNNELL, supra note 10.
100. Id.
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security. These comparisons indicate that substantial savings could be
achieved through adopting a non-fault plan."' The question which cannot
be answered is, conceding the likelihood of effecting substantial savings
by reducing administrative costs, whether such savings will permit
reducing premium costs to limits acceptable to motorists." 2 Variables
such as the inclusion of property damage and physical damage compensation, including deductible provisions, retaining the tort remedy for
large losses by providing a maximum coverage limit, and the claims
adjusting costs created, make it difficult to predict the savings. Because
non-fault plans involve an expansion of coverage to claims not now
covered, at least a part of the savings would provide funds for expansion.
The claims of the industry, self-serving though they may be, that a
subsfantial rate increase is required to fund non-fault compensation
suggest that administrative savings would not result in a substantial
rate reduction. This estimate by insurers is inferentially corroborated
by the design of several plans in which deductible features or excess
coverage provisions are adopted.'
The last alternative for reducing costs to insureds is to alter the
funding base. At present funding is provided by users who purchase
liability insurance policies. Several plans have been designed to alter this
funding base. The coverages provided are made excess to other benefits
to which the victim is entitled.0 Thus, the costs of motor vehicle accidents
would be in part shifted to other compensation systems. This has been
justified because other benefits systems are internally more efficient,
thereby maximizing benefits to the victim. 5 In the main, however, the
non-fault plans have continued traditional reliance upon the user for
funding compensation benefits,0 "' and several plans would increase such
reliance by compelling users to purchase coverage. 7 The implications
of this decision have not been throughly explored, nor has it been explained on other than pragmatic grounds.0 8 Allocating these costs to
101. R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH 81-84 (1967).
102. The criticisms by insurers of the Massachusetts rate reductions, and their
estimates of the costs involved would suggest that the estimates of possible savings made
by Messrs. Keeton and O'Connell are no error.
103. See, e.g., KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 10, and New York Plat, supra
note 15.
104. See, e.g., KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 7-8, and New York Plan,
supra note 15, at 89.

105. Id.
106. The only plans advocating non-user fundings are BLUM & KALvEN, supra note
10, and Franklin, supra note 79.
107. See KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 10, and New York Plan, supra note 15.
108. See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 341-43.
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motorists is compatible with the retention of private insurance,' and it
continues the allocation of accident costs to a group used to absorbing
them. What is strange is that, although allocating costs to other compensation systems, the possibility of allocating costs to other activities
which are known to cause motor vehicle accidents has not been explored.
The failure to achieve any reform in present methods for compensating accident victims is thus probably attributable to the failure of
the proposals to achieve a satisfactory allocation of accident costs and
funding responsibility.
The Allocation of FundingResponsibility to Motorists.
At present the allocation of responsibility to fund compensation
benefits to accident victims is supposedly achieved by the application of
tort law doctrines. In theory, victims are entitled to benefits only from
actors causally responsible for the harms suffered, provided the actor
was "negligent" in some manner. Victims who establish entitlement to
benefits within these limitations are compensated for all losses suffered,
and all losses suffered or incurred by them are allocated to the responsible
actor. Contributorily negligent victims are barred from receiving benefits, and must absorb all of their losses. Further limitations upon the
victim's recovery, such as duty, proximate cause, assumption of the risk
and various immunities, are utilized to prevent allocation of loss to the
actor under various circumstances in which it is felt that the victim
should not be compensated."' The theoretical basis of these limitations
is the tort assumption that remedy is a sanction."u Victims may shift
their losses only if the imposition of a sanction is appropriate. Accordingly, loss shifting is proper only when the actor's conduct is adjudged
morally reprehensible." 8 Unlike the antecedent criminal law, tort sanctions
are applied to unintended results of intentional acts." 4 Nonetheless, the
victim could reallocate his losses only to actors who in fact caused
109. See BLum & KALVEN, supra note 10, at 78-79.
110. To the extent the victim's private health and accident insurance, sick leave,
savings, etc., are made his primary source of compensation, victims, as a class, would
absorb costs. See CoNARD, supra note 10. Providing maximum coverage limits allocates
all costs in excess thereof to victims, except insofar as shifting is possible through the
retained tort remedy.
111. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].

112. See PROSSER, supra note 111, § 2 at 7-14.
113. 0. HoLams, THE Commor LAW (Howe ed. 1963), Lecture I at 1. But see
PROSSER, supra note 111, § 4 at 16-17.
114. See PROSSER, supra note 111, at 7-9. Hall, Interrelationsof Criminal Law and
Torts (pts. 1-2), 43 COLUm. L. REv. 753, 967 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Hall].

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

them.115 Tort law is not designed to be charitable.
When motor vehicles first came into use in this country, the common
law negligence action was applied by analogy to provide compensation
for the victims of accidents.1 6 As the ownership and use of motor
vehicles became prevalent, and the accident rate increased, a different
compensation system evolved; largely because motorists feared potential
financial responsibility the practice of purchasing liability insurance was
instituted. 1 7 As insurance funding became common, the older system was
modified in two ways. First, the initial administration of claims was
remitted to the insurer." 8 Second, the availability of financial resources
and the need of victims combined to generate an expansion of coverage
beyond the limitations formerly imposed by tort law doctrines." 9 By the
late 1960's, these modifications had combined to create a compensation
system in which most victims were receiving some compensation."1 '
However, various studies 1' of the operation of the new system had
uncovered inequities and malfunctions of sufficient seriousness to prompt
one commentator to term the result a "lottery. 122
Our use of and reliance upon the motor vehicle for transportation
had created a gap between the theoretical base for allocating the obligation
to fund and the actual basis for allocation. In fact the obligation was
imposed primarily as an incidence of the ownership and use of motor
vehicles, 1 3 although the sanction theory was retained with respect to
contributory fault, thereby affecting settlements and trial verdicts. With
this one exception, the system-in-fact moved away from the sanction
basis for allocating costs and imposing the funding responsibility,
although lip service was paid to user "fault" as the basis for imposing
this obligation.1

2

A variety of factors

combined to

effectuate

the

shift. Codifying the rules of the road and adopting the negligence
per se doctrine made it possible to establish driver error and "fault"
115. See H. HART AND A. HONORt, CAUSATION IN TIHE LAW (1959) ch. 5 and
PROSSER, supra note 111, § 341 at 240.
116. KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 15-28.
117. See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 71-75.
118. See CONARD, supra note 10, at 3.
119. See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 71-75.
120. See CONARD, supra note 10, at 62-74, 137-58.
121. See generally CONAID, supra note 10; HUNTING & NEUWIRTH, supra note 71;
Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automzobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 913

(1962).
122. See Franklin, supra note 79.
123. The purchase of insurance by owners of vehicles altered the allocation of the
funding, particularly as omnibus coverages became prevalent.
124. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Irsur-

ance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); BLU M & KALvEN, supra note 10, at 8-15; KEETON &
O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 16-22.
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with relative ease. The objective negligence theory obscured the distinctions among faulty attention, inexperience, lack of capacity to perform
tasks at required levels of competence, and lack of sensitivity to the
risks involved in driving. 2' By shifting the basis for allocating the funding obligation, motorists were obligated under circumstances in which
they not only were not guilty of morally reprehensible conduct, but also
were not even causally responsible for accidents or injuries in any
meaningful sense if a sanction were being imposed.
Litigation processes have influenced the legal system's approach to
accident causation and explain the de facto shift in the rationale for
allocating funding. The tort remedy is one instituted by the victim, who
must establish the actor's conduct and its connection with his harm.
So long as funding responsibility requires victim initiation of litigation
and victim proof of causality, it is essential to define causation in a limited
way that permits victims to establish its existence within available
evidentiary resources. The legal system does not require victims to seek
funding from all sources which may have combined to harm them. It is
enough for the victim to establish that the actor's conduct was a substantial and producing cause of his harm.'- 8 Victims also are not compelled to seek relief from all causally relevant agencies in proportion to their
contribution to the harm. Once any actor's causal responsibility is established, he must provide the victim with total compensation benefits. If
apportionment of responsibility can be established actors may apportion, 2" but victims need not do so. They may seek funding from only the
actor or actors they believe can readily be held responsible.'
What has resulted is a narrowly proscribed study of the causes of
accidents. The vehicle user has become the primary "cause" of motor
vehicle accidents, because he is the most highly visible actor, and also a
financially responsible one. The user's conduct is an easily established
causal activity, making proof of driver error the simplest and most
financially rewarding investigation of accident causes. The legal system
has aided and abetted this concentration of attention by adopting financial
responsibility laws and traffic codes, and by easing the victim's evidentiary
125. See Hall, supra note 114, at 981: "Nor have we begun to distinguish the
various types of negligence, such as those occasioned by faulty attention, lack of moral
sensitivity, inexperience, overwork, and other environmental factors." For a study of
driving behavioral patterns, see M. PARRY, AGGRESSION ON THE ROAD : A PILOT STUDY OF
In general, see M. AUSTIN, AccIDENT
BEHAVIOR IN THE DRIVING SITUATION (1968).
BLACK SPOT (1966).
126. See PROSSER, supra note 111, §§ 42 and 47.
127. See PROSSER, supra note 111, § 42, and Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1127 (1934).
128. See PROSSER, supra note 111, § 42.
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responsibilities. The result has been to obscure a realistic appraisal of
motor vehicle accident causation by the legal system.
This can be demonstrated by examining the studies of accident
causes which have been made by investigators from other disciplines." 9
World War II provided the impetus for investigating the causes of
accidental injuries of many kinds. Psychologists have studies the attitudes,
motivations, aggressions and mental condition of people involved in
accidents."' Engineers have studied control systems and the problem of
designing systems which can be operated within the physical and mental
limitations of the human being."' Medical researchers have investigated
the causes of traumatic insult to the body and have suggested a number
of ways of reducing their effects." 2 Similar investigations into the effect
of alcohol and drugs upon motor mechanisms and sensory capabilities
have been made.' Transportation engineers and systems analysts have
studied traffic patterns, road environment and many other aspects of
motoring."3 The result of all these investigations has been the discovery
of quite a different etiology of motor vehicle accidents than that achieved
by the legal system. A summary statement of the conclusions reached by
these investigations has become almost a truism: motor vehicle accidents
and injuries are caused by the operator, the vehicle, and the motoring
environment. These factors may operate singly but more often interact
to cause accidents and resultant harms. Such investigations conclude
that driver error, the major cause of accidents located by the legal system,
plays a less significant role in causing accidents than the legal system
assumes.
The Vehicle as Accident Cause. Since the publication in 1965 of Mr.
Ralph Nader's book, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED,'3 " the public has become
increasingly aware of the motor vehicle's contribution to accidents. The
extensive regulatory efforts of the Department of Transportation are
proof not only of the recognition that vehicles cause accidents, but of
129.

It is obviously not possible to provide a complete bibliography of the relevant

literature. Perhaps the most widely available general sources are: ARTHUR D.
INC., THE STATE OF THE ART OF TRAFFIC SAFETY (1966) ; ACCIDENT RESEARCH:

LITTLE,
METH-

ODS AND APPROACHES (W. Haddon, Jr., E. Suchrnan, & D. Klein eds. 1964) [hereinafter

cited as Haddon] ; and Curran & Chayet, supra note 74.
130. See, e.g., Haddon, supra note 129, at 385-437, and Curran & Chayet, supra note
74, at 145.
131. See Michaels, Systems Research in Safety, in Haddon, supra note 129, at 366.
132. See Curran & Chayet, supra note 74, at 196-305, and Haddon, supra note 129,
at 680-720.
133. See Haddon, supra note 129, at 101, 208, 351, 358.
134. See Haddon, supra note 129, at 217, 674.
135. See NADER, supra note 3.

UNIFORM MOTOR TRANSPORT POLICY

317

the societal demand for improved vehicle safety. 8 ' The legal profession
has known the accident potential of vehicular defects at least since 'Mr.
McPherson sued the Buick Motor Company.'
Success of the assault
upon the citadel of privity has greatly increased the volume of litigation
seeking recovery for injuries caused by automotive product defects. An
examination of any standard treatise on the subject discloses the extent
to which almost all the of parts and systems of automobiles have proved
capable of being defective and of causing motor vehicle accidents. 8 '
One aspect of current research illustrates difficulties in applying tort
causation principles to accidents. The most serious injuries in motor
vehicle accidents occur as the result of the so-called "second collision"
between passenger and car rather than from the initial impact. 8 ' Efforts
have been made to require seat belts, in hopes of reducing the severity
of the second collision. 4" Regulations requiring padding, recessing of
knobs and the reduction of protrusions are also attempts to reduce the
severity of the injuries produced in accidents. 4 ' Despite recognition that
design features cause injuries, it has not been feasible to reflect this in
allocating the responsibility to fund compensation benefits. This illustrates
the legal inability to distinguish between the causation of an accident and
the causation of an injury that results from the accident. The accident
may have one or more causes producing injuries. These injuries may,
in fact, have been increased in severity by vehicular design features.
Within the confines of traditional tort theory, however, so long as one
cause of injury can be identified, full compensation is obtained from that
cause. The "thin skull" rule requiring the defendant to take the victim
as he finds him is the paradigm. Thus under current law, by analogy, the
defendant must accept vehicle design as he finds it. 4" The effect of these
136. See, e.g., GOODMAN, supra note 6, and O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58
Nw. U.L. Rxv. 299 (1963).
137. McPherson v. Buick Motor Car Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
138. See GoODMAN, supra note 6, at ch. 6.
139. See NADER, supra note 3, at ch. 3; Campbell, Twelve Years of Automobile
Crash Research, in Curran & Chayet, stpra note 74, at 1; Kulkowsld, The Anatomy of
Driver Injuries in a Group of 125 Road Accidents, in Curran & Chayet, supra note 74, at
196; and Swearingen, Tolerance of the Human Face to Crash Impact, in Curran & Chayet, sipranote 74, at 223.
140. See NADER, sipra note 3, at 85-98, Michelson, Aldman, Tourin & Mitchell,
Dynamic Tests of Automobile Passenger Restraining De'vices, in Haddon, sitpra note

129, at 688.

141. See

GOODAIAN,

supra note 6, at 307-11.

142. But see Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr.
305 (1970), imposing manufacturer liabilities for a design defect enhancing an injury to
a passenger and for death of the driver. See also Comment, Manufacturer'sDuty, Reasonably to Protect Occupants Against the Effects of Collision, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 396; and
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rules is to place causal responsibility for injuries enhanced by poor
vehicle design upon the motorist, despite the existence of an equally
culpable cause, the vehicle. A failure to apportion funding responsibility
in such cases has substantially increased the costs of accidents to one
group while benefiting another. Insofar as this occurs in a consistent
pattern, it has the effect of misallocating costs to the detriment of the
primary funding source.
The Environment as Accident Cause.' It is not novel to assert
that operators and motor vehicles cause motor vehicle accidents. It is
perhaps more surprising to learn that the environment within which
driving occurs is also a substantial cause of accidents. A moment's
reflection identifies certain accident-producing environmental hazards
such a chuck holes in the road, unmarked road hazards, ditches, and the
like.' However, recent analysis of motor vehicle accidents has identified
many more environmental features which contribute to high accident
rates. The visibility of traffic signals is often obscured by neon signs."'
Road side advertising signs distract drivers. 4 The frequency of occurrence
of accidents is significantly higher with certain adjacent land uses than
with others. 4 As any safety engineer or traffic control officer knows,
certain locations "breed" accidents while others do not.' 48 This may be
partially explained by differences in traffic volume. Often, however,
locations having almost identical traffic volumes have varying accident
frequencies. Insurance companies have recognized environmental differences in their rating formulas and districts are classified according
to risk. However the contribution of environmental factors to motoring
accidents has not been recognized when allocating the responsibility to
fund victim compensation.
Tort law has never purported to allocate accident costs to all
causally responsible actors with much precision. The extreme imprecision
of allocatng costs upon a causality basis is the result of the investigative
limitations of the adversary system and the difficulties in establishing
factually the complicated causal interelationships between the elements
Comment, Torts: Automobile Manufacturer's Liability for Secondary Impact Injuries,
23 OKLA. L. REV. 296 (1970).
143. See generally Korkoff, Automobile Insurance: Some Environmental Observations, 1 CONN. L. REv. 125 (1968).
144. See Stonex, Roadside Design for Safety, in Haddon, supra note 129, at 707.
145. See McMonagle. The Effect of Roadside Featuresin Traffic Accidents, in Haddon, supra note 129, at 217-24.
146. OuTDOOR ADVERTISING: HISTORY AND REGULATION 223 (J. Houck ed. 1969);

McMonagle, supra note 145, at 223-24.
147. See note 145 szapra at 217-24.
148. Id.
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of the motor' transportation system. As Felix S. Cohen has pointed
out:19 ". .. judgments of causality vary with the stand point of the
observer. . . .,"' With motor. vehicle accidents, the legal system has

transformed its judgment of causation into a search for highly visible;
financially responsible actors having some connection with the victim's
harm. The sanctioning rationale, with its limitation upon allocating the
funding obligation only to activities causing harm in a substantial
way, has been considerably modified. Costs are now allocated in part as
sanction and in part because motorists are financially responsible and
victims are needy. Because of these developments abandonment of the
sanctioning rationale as a means of allocating the responsibility to fund
benefits has been advocated. 15' In effect, benefits would be funded by
imposing an activity tax on vehicle ownership or use." 2 As most nonfault plans utilize user-funding, the implications of allocating funding
responsibility on a non-causal basis deserve exploration.
In many ways allocating the responsibility of funding benefits
to motorists in part as a sanction and in part as an activity tax has
attractions despite the resultant mis-allocation of accident costs. It accords
with the methods now used to provide such funds, thus permitting
reasonably accurate predictions about the impact of the tax upon the
economy, upon the taxed group, and as to the revenues generated. It
also retains compatability with private insurance. It is, however, an
allocation with disadvantages. To the extent that motor vehicle users are
being taxed for non-caused accidents, other causally responsible activities
are not being forced to provide funding. Users must subsidize these
activities without a rational decision that such subsidies are appropriate. 55
Failing to allocate the funding responsibility to all causally responsible
activities in proportion to their contribution to accidents eliminates the
possibility of using such allocation to assist in reducing the number or
severity of accidents. 54 Any deterrent force, retributive or educative, from
149. Cohen, Field Theory and JdicialLogic, 59 YALE L.. 238 (1950).
150. Id. at 254.
151. Franklin, supra note 79; R. IEEToN, VENTURING To Do JUsTICE (1969), ch. 8.

See generally Kalven, A Scheme of Alternatives to the Present Auto Accident Tort System, 1 CONN. L. REv. 33 (1968).
152. Professor Robert Keeton, in particular, has advocated the allocation of finding
responsibility to motorists upon a tax basis. Keeton, supra note 151. Professor Keeton

argues for a motorist tax as a "cost-benefit' form of tort. See generally, R. MUSGRAvE,
THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1959), ch. 4, for a discussion of benefits taxation.
The difficulty with benefits taxation as applied to motorists is that many non-motorists

also benefit from motoring. The tax falls upon some but not all beneficiaries.
153. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960).
154. Professor Guido Calabresi has explored this problem in several articles and a
recent book. In particular, See Calabresi, Does the Fadt System Optimally Control Pri-
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imposing a sanction is lost. Activity tax funding reduces individual choicemaking as a factor in rational allocations of economic resources."' 5 Finally,
activity tax funding operates regressively. 5 ' These disadvantages combine
to make user-tax funding of compensation benefits a questionable policy,
largely because they represent a series of decisions, all of which operate
to reduce the likelihood of achieving a safer motoring system. 5 '
In order to evaluate these disadvantages and to understand the
adverse effect of activity tax funding upon motoring safety, it is essential
to understand something of the economics of resource allocations. Guido
Calabresi has devoted considerable thought to this question."' Calabresi's
initial efforts involved so-called differential costs and what he labeled
"general deterrence."' 59 In his most recent book.. he has made an
extensive analysis of the issues posed by any allocation selected for
mary Accident Costs?, 33 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROD. 429 (1968) ; G. CALABRES, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOmiC ANALYSIS (1970), chs. 5 and 10. See also,
McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 3,31-34
(1970).
155. See R. MUSGRAVE, THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1959) at ch. 3.
156. An economist who reviewed the manuscript suggested that the author's prejudices were showing by labeling regressivity as a disadvantage. In part this is true.
However, the disadvantages of a regressive tax upon some motorists are real. The economically disadvantaged, whether rural or urban, must rely upon the automobile for
transport, for public transportation is not often available. The movement of businesses
and industry from the core city, the restrictions placed upon location of low cost housing,
urban renewal, and similar aspects of modern life have conspired to make the use of
automobiles essential for all people. The investment cost is very high. Adding to that
the usually higher premium costs of insurance, based as it usually is on geographic location, age of vehicle, and so forth, creates a serious question about the fairness of a regressive tax. This insight is not new. See BLUMr & KALVEN, supra note 10, at 37-38. See
also Koskoff, Automobile Insurance: Some Environmental Observations, 1 CONN. L.
REv. 125 (1968).
157. Although the remainder of this article will develop this point, mention here
need be made of the way regressivity would reduce safety. High insurance premium
costs reduce money available for purchase of safer vehicles or for car maintenance. A
strict vehicle inspection program could "force" investment for a safer vehicle. This
would seem a socially more desirable use of limited personal reserves than does payment
of high insurance premium costs.
158. Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blutn and Kalven, 75
YALE L.J. 216 (1965) ; Calabresi, Views and Overvuiews, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 600; Calabresi, Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?, 33 LAw AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 429 (1968) ; Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 67 (1968) ; Calabresi, The Decision for
Accidents: An Approach to Nonjazdt Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1965);
Calabresi, Reflections on Medical Experimentation in Humans, DAEDALUS 387 (1969)
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499
(1961); G. CALABRESI & K. BASS III, RIGHT APPROACH, WRONG ImPLICATION: A CRI-

TIQUE OF McKEAN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY (on file, Yale University Law Library).
159. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts (pts.
1-2), 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
160. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970) [hereinafter cited as COSTS OF ACCIDENTS].
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compensation funding. 61 Initially, he constructs a model economy. In a
model economy, all real costs of activities, including the costs of accidents
attributable to that activity and the costs of administering the claims so
generated, must be ultimately borne by the activity as a result of economic
laws, despite any tentative allocation of those costs. 62 In a real economy,
all costs are not necessarily borne by causally responsible activities,
nor are costs necessarily distributed differentially." 3 There are many
reasons why the perfect allocations occurring in the model cannot be
achieved in an actual economy. First, the transfer cost resulting from
re-allocating losses initially allocated improperly must be subtracted
each time a re-allocation occurs. " ' Re-allocations also produce administrative costs.'6 5 Also, in order to implement various social policies, it may
not be desirable for an activity to bear its full share of generated costs.
Some activities may require a subsidy. " If so, other activities must pay
more than their proportional share of such costs. This may be accomplished by the economy's public sector through taxation, or through
mis-allocations to other causally responsible activities. Furthermore, unlike a model economy, a real one is not always immediately responsive
to pressures forcing a proper allocation of costs. As a result it is not
possible or desirable to achieve the perfect allocation of the real social
costs of an activity such as motoring.
Calabresi devotes a substantial portion of his book to the proper
bases for allocating accident costs in a real economy. Recognizing that
an activity can be prohibited completely or regulated so as to limit the
manner in which it is conducted, 67 he states that it is theoretically

possible to so regulate activities that they will be perfectly safe.
Realistically this is not feasible to do; hence most activities will be
injury producing to some degree.' 68 Because regulation and enforcement
is expensive and not always effective, it is often cheaper and more efficient
to accept less than totally safe activities and provide compensation to
161. The summary which follows cannot possibly do justice to Professor Calabresi's
work. It may, indeed, distort his views to some extent.

162. See

CosTs OF AcCIDENTS,

supra note 160, at ch. 5.

163. See Calabresi's description of what he labels "the world of perfect general
deterrence," in CosTs OF AcCIDENTS, supra note 160, at 88-94.
164. See Calabresi, Transaction Costs, 11 J. LAw & EcoN. 67 (1968); McKean,
ProdtctsLiability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 34-36 (1970).
165. See CosTs oF ACCIDENTS, supra note 160, at 143-50, 225-26.
166. Id. at 18-21. An interesting argument in this regard is made by Buchanan,
In Defense of Caveat Emnptor, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 64, 72-73 (1970). Buchanan suggests
that cheaper, less-safe products are desirable inasmuch as they permit consumers a wider
product choice than would result from any system of perfect accident cost allocation.
167. See COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 160, at 113-29; see also id., ch. 16.
168. Id. at 17-18. Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1415 (1969).
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those injured or harmed by the activity. Calabresi labels this a "decision
for accidents."' 69 Once such a decision has been made, funding must be
found for the accident benefits for persons inevitably injured. If perfect
cost allocation were desirable, the problem would be solely one of
calculating the accident costs generated by an activity and charging the
activity with them. As this is neither possible nor desirable, 7 ' and since
the allocation must reflect not only causation of accidents but also matters
of economic and social policy, the difficulties are really ones in deciding
the proper mixture among regulation and enforcement costs, allocation
of costs to achieve deterrence, desired subsidies, and minimizing the
administrative expenses generated by administering a compensation
scheme.'"'
Implicit throughout Calabresi's analysis is the concept that accident
costs should be allocated initially to the activity and to the specific actors
within that activity that produce them. 2 This is required in order to
accurately reflect the true economic costs of the activity and the differential costs among individual actors.' It is only after accidents are attributed to their causes that it is possible to make the necessary choices
among regulation and enforcement, prohibition of activities or actors, or
compensation for injuries "permitted" to occur. 4 Once costs are initially
attributed to their causal sources, rational decisions can be made about
re-allocations, subsidies, taxation, and funding compensation. Identifying
the producing cause or causes is the sive qua non to any allocative
decisions. Initial allocations are difficult to make, but must be made by
a method akin to the substantial producing cause limitation of the legal
system or the "could have prevented" definition of the safety engineers.
The activity must produce injury in some substantial way in order for
the harm to be so allocated. Some concept of causation must be applied in
order to accurately allocate costs to the responsible activities.
169. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: Ai Approach to Non-Fault Allocation
of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1965).
170. See COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 160, particularly chs. 7 and 8, in which
he discusses the problem he labels "what is the cost of what."
171. See COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 160, ch. 12.
172. In chs. 7 and 8 of COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 160, Calabresi discusses the
problem of allocating costs to responsible activities. He recognizes that allocative decisions are not made in a world of perfect knowledge, and that allocations vary, depending
upon whether the market or governmental regulatory activity is utilized as the allocative
agency. He does not purport to discuss the bases for achieving proper allocations.
173. See, Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. LAW & Ecox. 1 (1960).
174. Felix S. Cohen made this point in a most apt way: "What we actually do
when we look for a legal cause is to pick out of this infinity of intersecting strands a
useful point at which public pressure can be placed." Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial
Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 252 (1950).
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Imposing an activities tax upon motorists does not provide the best
or even a rational method of allocation. Rather, it is based upon
expediency, despite the mis-allocation of costs which results. User-funding
beyond causal limits has been explained as imposing funding responsibility on the same basis as workmen's compensation funding or other
forms of strict liability. 75 The analogy, however, is not valid. Prior to
non-fault motor vehicle accident compensation plans, the allocation of
accident costs by the legal system beyond causal limits has been placed
only upon economically productive activities. The classes upon whom
liability was imposed were enterprises: blasters, common carriers, innkeepers, employers and, most recently, manufacturers and sellers of
products.' 76 Imposing liability on such groups seemed appropriate in light
of the large number of accidents they produced and the large social
problems created by treating the victims.' The educative and deterrent
effect in applying a sanction was a useful tool to encourage safety. As
to the non-activity caused losses, imposing liability on an enterprise could
be rationalized in two ways. First, although the enterprise was not
responsible in a causal sense, victims needed money. The enterprise was
receiving a general economic benefit from being permitted to engage in
the activity and could better afford to absorb the costs of these injuries
as an initial matter than could these victims." 8 It was in a better position
to pass on the costs through price adjustments so that they could
eventually be absorbed by the causative activity, or by society at large
in the absence of a causative human or economic activity."7 Secondly,
remedies for re-allocating responsibility to causative activities were provided by the legal system. Although the costs of imposing liability
vicariously were absorbed initially by the employer, they could in theory
be re-allocated to the employee" 0 or to the ultimate consumer. Most
workmen's compensation acts permit the employer to be subrogated to
In particular by Professor Robert Keeton, R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JusKEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 10, at 72-73. BLUM &
I-ALvEi, supra note 10, at 54-65, have effectively criticized the analogy.
176. See, generally PROSSER, supra note 111, § 77 at 519, § 79 at 541, and ch. 19;
Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 103 (1970).
177. The clearest evidence of the activity or enterprise as primary cause of injury
may be located in a study of workmen's compensation "arising out of" cases. Although
relatively infrequent when compared with the total number of claims processed, they have
engendered considerable discussion about the limits of coverage provided. In general,
see 1 A. LARSEN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1968), ch. III.
178. See COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 160, at 40-41.
179. Id.
180. See A. CONARD & R. KNAUSS, BusINESS ORGANIZATION : CASES AND MATERIALS 86-90 (1965).
175.

TICE

(1969), at ch. 9. See also
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the employee's remedy against a causally responsible actor. 1 ' The
assembler or seller of a defective product may seek recovery from the
parts manufacturer actually responsible." 2 All in all, imposing these
responsibilities has worked quite well, has compensated the victims,
applied a useful economic sanction when activities were causally responsible, and has provided a means of transferring these costs improperly
allocated.
Enterprise or activity liability, although a reasonably effective and
fair allocation of accident costs when applied to economically productive
activity under circumstances in which most accidents are caused by the
activity, does not operate in the same fashion when utilized as an
allocative device for motoring accident costs. Motoring accidents are
caused by several activities operating simultaneously. Imposing the cost
burden for most accidents on one activity, motoring, cannot be rationalized
as activity liability in the same sense that employer's liability for workmen's compensation benefits or manufacturer's liability for defective
products can be rationalized. Motoring, though often occuring as part
of an economically productive activity, especially if transportation toand-from work is so considered, also is motivated by consumption
activities-shopping, recreation and the like. 3 In the latter form, cost
mis-allocations cannot be re-allocated by product or service price adjustments, but only through wage adjustments. Thus mis-allocations of
accident costs are more likely and less easily remedied when compared
with activity or enterprise liability. Transactional costs are very high,
particularly in view of the number of causal variables working to produce
motoring accidents. Differential costs are almost impossible to shift.
The foregoing criticisms of user-funding, though serious, do not
appear decisive despite the complaints of the user-group about high costs.
The monetary values of the mis-allocations are unknown. Depending
upon one's estimate of the contribution of environmental, vehicular and
operator activities to accidents, the mis-allocation of accident costs is or
is not great. However, if an activity tax form of funding is adopted
without modification, the extent of the mis-allocations will never be
known. To the extent that funding is allocated to systems totally unrelated
to motoring, the mis-allocation of costs is increased. Professor Calabresi
has pointed out: "The justification found most often among legal writers
today for allocation of accident losses on a non-fault basis is that accident
losses will be least burdensome if they are spread broadly among people
181. 2 A. LARSEN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw (1970), ch. XIV.
182. 3 FRu mE &FR -DMAN, PRoDucTs LiABmrnY (1960), ch. XV.
183. See Franklin, supra note 79.
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and over time."'' However, as Calabresi has also shown, the principal
function of accident law "is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents
and the costs of avoiding accidents."'8 5 By giving primary significance
to monetary requirements, the safety function of accident law has been
largely ignored. As most proponents of compensation reform have taken
the position that tort law does not deter motorists' bad driving,' they
apparently believe that the allocation of responsibility to causal sources
has no role to play in funding benefits. 8 7 Even if it is conceded that the
imposition of a funding responsibility under no circumstances alters
conduct, that still does not justify ignoring safety when designing a
compensation plan. The allocation of funding responsibility is a question
distinct from the allocation of costs to causal sources. Although the
former may be placed upon motorists as a matter of political expediency,
the latter ought be achieved as accurately and completely as is possible to
do.
Sanction-basedRating: Toward A Safer MotoringEnvironment.
There are several advantages to retention of some system of allocating accident costs initially to those activities causing physical harm in a
"could have prevented" sense; the sense used by traffic safety specialists.
To the extent an initial allocation is so made, valuable information about
accidents is obtained. Accident-producing activities, land uses, and vehicle
designs, can be identified. Once these activities and conditions have been
identified, rational decisions can be made about cost allocations and
corrective measures. Sanctions need not always deter: correction is also
a goal.' National policy favors safer motoring and correction: accident
prevention and reduction is in the national interest. Correction has not
184. See CosTs OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 160, at 39.
185. Id. at 26. Professor Calabresi's original statement gives the requirements of
justice equal significance as a function of accident law.
186. See, e.g., KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 10, at 247-49. Franklin, supra note
79, at 781, states: "The fault system is not needed to create deterrence. While it may
be true that in order to deter carelessness something must be done to the transgressor,
there is no logical reason why treatment of the transgressor should be tied inexorably
to treatment of the victim. We already regulate conduct through our relatively mature
system of criminal sanctions and our rapidly developing structure of administrative law."
187. Id.
188. See generally J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw (2d ed. 1960),
at ch. IX; H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968), particularly chs.
3 and 4, is an excellent discussion of sanctioning rationales, and argues persuasively for

a combined deterrence and rehabilitative theory for criminal punishment. Although much
of what Chancellor Packer says is relevant to a discussion of the rationale for imposing
economic sanctions through imposing an obligation to find compensation benefits, for
now it is enough to note that correction is one legitimate aim of sanctioning, and that
the educative effects of sanction-based allocations of funding responsibility would be reduced by user-funding of non-fault compensation plans.
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to date been emphasized in discussing the allocation of motoring accident
costs,"8 9 and the issue has been treated as one of providing benefits to
victims. The issue is not that alone, although providing compensation
is an important consideration. The role any compensation system ought
to play in furthering national transportation policies is equally important.
Those policies include our continued reliance upon motoring as a major
transportation instrument and improving the safety record of the motoring
activity. A compensation system which permits the allocation of funding
or the initial allocation of costs to causal activities could play an important
role in furthering traffic safety. To the extent that costs are not allocated
initially to causally relevant activities, decisions for safety are less likely
to be made by drivers, manufacturers, public agencies, and activities
adversely affecting the driving environment. From the traffic safety
perspective, all elements of the motor transportation system are suspect
as accident producers. It is much easier to design a reasonably safe
system around human limitations than to attempt a substantial redesign
of the driver, if the information to do so is available. It is also possible
to train humans to operate motor vehicles in a reasonably safe manner
if bad drivers are identified. It is possible to alter the vehicle and the
motoring environment to reduce accidents with knowledge of accident
creating conditions, and by assisting drivers in performing the complex
tasks required to control an automobile. Furthermore it is possible to
reduce the severity of accidents through redesign of the vehicle and the
environment when it is not feasible to eliminate the possibility of
accidents occurring at all, if injury enhancing features can be identified. 9 '
At present accident statistics are not being used effectively to
promote a safer motoring climate. Accident information is collected by
law enforcement agencies, by insurers, by traffic safety engineers, and by
governmental agencies responsible for various parts of the motor transport system. An accident triggers the gathering of information about
defects in the system. Police and insurance claims adjusters investigate
accidents. Motorists must file accident reports in compliance with
189. Except insofar as the deterrent effect of a tort judgment upon an individual
driver has been doubted, the complex of sanctions imposed civilly and criminally upon
drivers and their effectiveness as a package has not been evaluated, although studies of
specific sanctions have been made. In particular, see A. ANTONY, SUSPENSION AND REvoCATION OF DRIVERs' LICENSES (rev. ed. 1966) and R. McGuide, et at, Modifying Negligent Driver Behavior Through Warning-Letters, Calif. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1969).
See also Conway, Is Criminal or Civil Procedure Proper for Enforcement of Traffic
Laws (pts. 1-2), 1959 Wis. L. REV. 41, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 1.
190. See Michaels, Systems Research in Safety in Haddon, supra note 129, at 366,
and Goldston. Social Relations: The Emerging Behavioral Science, 19 CASE W. REs. L.
REV.

78 (1967).
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financial responsibility laws. This information is not now being collected
in a systematic way, nor is it being analyzed and used to make decisions
wlich would lead to improvements which would reduce the number and
severity of accidents.19 ' Since accidents generate considerable information,
an accident compensation system has an obvious role in gathering and
analyzing information of great value and assistance in improving traffic
1

safety.

2

Adopting of some form of non-fault compensation plan permits the
separation of two questions: formerly, tort actions decided both the
compensation due and the funding responsibility simultaneously. By
using an insurance fund to provide benefits immediately, it is not
necessary to decide to whom funding should be allocated at the same time.
So long as the fund is solvent, victims entitled to compensation can be
paid without regard to the sources of the funds. The sources can be
identified and further resources obtained on a periodic basis and without
regard to particular occurrences except insofar as each occurrence is
used to establish the funding group and the appropriate monetary level
of contribution. Each accident thus serves a statistical purpose. Accumulating accident statistics and analyzing them with appropriate techniques
allows causal relationships to be established statistically. Significant correlations would establish the contribution of causal factors over periods
of time despite the impossibility of doing so in any single occurrence.." 3
As an example of the possibilities of the techniques, if the unusual
incidence of single vehicle accidents involving Corvairs had been analyzed
by such methods, it would have established the vehicle's culpability, once a sufficient number of incidents had occurred to permit the
The same analysis might be
statistical exclusion of other variables.'
191.

The proposed collection and analysis of information by a governmental agency

raises an issue of individual privacy. See WESTON, PRIVACY AND FMaDOM

(1967);

Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in
an Information Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. RELv. 1091, 1136-40 (1969). As the infor-

mation erquired is already being collected by the policy insurance companies and governmental agencies, the major risk of additional loss of privacy lies in the centralized collection and storage of information already available from diverse sources. Access presumably could be limited, although some states have sold license lists to private businesses.
192. In most states today, administrative responsibility over insurers is separated

from administrative responsibility for licensing and financial responsibility enforcement.
Implementing the plan proposed here need not involve a consolidation of responsibilities.
It would require only the channeling of information from various sources to the computer, wherever located, and a program which would provide the varying outputs required

for each agency.
193. For a description of the use of a quantitative multivariate analysis to solve
legal problems see Lozowick, Steiner and Miller, Law and Quantitative Mfltivariate
Analysis: An Enrcounter, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1641 (1968).
194. Ralph Nader reported over 100 suits alleging instability in the Corvair had
been filed by October, 1965. See, NoAnn, suprra note 3, at 7.
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used to identify accident sites where a poorly designed environment
is a factor.' 9 Analytic techniques operating on large numbers of incidents
can provide proof not available when dealing with one such incident.
Once causal contributions are established, costs can be allocated to responsible activities, and alternative funding possibilities considered. The
statistical techniques are available. They are a modification of present
rating practices, 96 which usually are based upon predicted incidence
rates, 97 although a greater number of variables would be analyzed than
is presently true. The merit rating systems developed by some insurers
foreshadow use of multiple variable analysis in this setting.'
The kind of analysis proposed requires informational inputs in a
form which can be analyzed. The accident reports now used in most
states might need revision to reflect additional information. In large
part, though, the information needed to identify non-driver causes of
accidents is already being obtained. Information about the contribution of
vehicle defects, for example, is reported by the user, the police, and by
vehicle inspectors.' 99 To illustrate, motorists often report that they did
not see the victim. This may be a result of driver error, of a poorly
designed vehicle, or of environmental factors obstructing vision."9 The
specific occurrence might be assignable to each category. If, however, a
number of accidents occur at the same locations, involving different
makes of vehicles and different types of users, the pattern identifies the
environmental variable as causally significant. Little change in data
gathering processes needs be made to produce the information for such
195. A pilot project has proved successful in Marion County, Indiana (Indianapolis). Reported in a personal conversation with Dr. John Stoner, Indiana University
Department of Government.
196. For a description of customary rating practices see Auto Rates: The Big Picture, 45 J. Azr. INs. 24 (1969) ; Curry, Refinement of Automobile Rates and Underwriting Classes, 31 J. RisK & Ins. 217 (1964).
197. Most rating has not been particularly successful. See Mehr, Merit Rating, 54
BEsT's INS.

NEws 21 (1953);

ARTHUR

D. LITrLE, INc., THE

STATE OF THE ART OF

TRAFrIc SAFETY (1966). Merit rating is currently required in North Carolina and is
available in New York. See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 84.
198. As has been true throughout the preparation of this article, Professors Blum
and Kalven in their remarkable essay, supra note 10, at 67-71, have preceded the author
to this conclusion. They suggest the need for "experimentation and greater daring in
setting insurance rates for the sake of creating more deterrent impact." Id. at 69.
199. In states, such as Indiana, having vehicle inspection laws.
200. At present, failure to observe is usually charged to driver error. Investigating
police often issue tickets for such failures. More often citations for failure to yield the
right of way encompass operator failure to observe. If an accident occurred, it is common for the motorist to be interviewed and his explanation recorded. Such explanations
would provide much useful information, as would diagrams by investigating police
officers.
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a causal analysis."'
Once the informational inputs are obtained, 2 they must be analyzed.
Data storage and retrieval systems with sufficient capacity to perform
the computations necessary to analyze for causal types are already installed in most states." 3 The programming is, of course, critical. Initially
the program should be designed to reflect the variables now used by
insurers to rate, plus other variables which have been identified as
causing accidents or injuries. Classes and sub-classes by causal type could
be added or subtracted to reflect the developing state of the art of traffic
safety. Ideally the analysis should be performed by a governmental
agency charged with responsibilities for administering and licensing
financial responsibility laws and insurance rates. Insurers themselves
might be able to perform the analysis through some form of information
pooling arrangement." 4 A computer program has been designed at
Indiana University which can be utilized to perform the necessary
205
analysis.
The final step is to translate the statistical patterns which emerge
into funding allocations and safety decisions. Any novelty in the proposed
plan rests upon using the analysis to allocate responsibility for funding
compensation benefits to non-users. To avoid the political ramifications,
several approaches are available. The least disruptive of the status quo
would approximate the funding allocation now in use and proposed for
most non-fault plans. Hence, the only innovation would be to require
insurance rating based upon the variables. 20 Funding would remain solely
the responsibility of users in part as a tax and in part as a sanction.
The user through the various rating adjustments reported to him would
be in a position to adjust his driving habits, vehicle choice and driving
environment, or to pay increased premium costs without altering his
activities and choices. At a minimum the impact would be educational,
201. Dr. John Stoner reported that all information necessary for identifying accident locations needing improvement by computer analysis was available from police accident reports.
202. Analysis of reports for computer-coding would require a fairly large trained
staff. Presumably insurance companies could provide most coding, although it could
be done by a state agency.
203. At the present time most states are storing license and registration information
in computers. Many states have installed centralized storage and retrieval equipment
which enables police to obtain information about vehicle ownership rapidly. As to the
utility of tapping this information for insurance rating purposes, see Vonda, A Revised
Plait for Protective Automobile Intsurance, 1969 INs. LAw J. 7 (1969).
204. Id. at 7, 28.
205. As reported in a conversation with Dr. John Stoner, Indiana University Department of Government. Dr. Stoner has designed a computer program which uses
traffic accident information to identify dangerous road locations.
206. See COSTS OF AccIDENTS, supra note 160, at 145-50.
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although it could also generate political action inasmuch as motorists
might mobilize to demand safer vehicles and a safer driving environment.
Presumably a modified merit rating system would direct the motorist's
attention to the varying accident risks he has assumed or to which he
exposes others. Some have doubted that imposing financial responsibility
upon motorists has any deterrence effect. Such criticisms may be valid
when directed toward an after-the-fact imposition of responsibility. They
are not necessarily valid, however, when judging the efficacy of directing
information to motorists before-the-fact.
The heart of this approach is a redesigned rating system. It must
permit translating the causal variables into rating variables. One possible
rating system would consist of the following components: a base rate,
representing that group of accidents traditionally viewed as unavoidable,
or to which it is not possible to locate a cause; a user rate, based upon
diverse factors such as driving record; a vehicle rate, reflecting the
sum of the safety risks presented by the vehicle; and a driving environment rate, based upon vehicle use, miles per year driven, neighborhood,
and customary routes driven. Each general rate category could be broken
down further into sub-rates reflecting sub-variables? ° Premium charges
to each insured would be the sum of the premium charges for each
category. Insureds would thus be provided with information about the
respective driving risks his driving involves or encounters.
By providing users with additional information about motoring risks,
a modified merit rating plan might achieve greater safety than is currently
the case. However it would not use funding responsibility to reflect causal
contribution. Mis-allocations of the real costs of all activities contributing
to accidents still result; thus, modified merit rating does not make full
use of the possibilities for deterring or educating all causally responsible
actors to act in a way to reduce accidents. In order to achieve this, all
causally responsible activities must be financially responsible ones. There
are several ways this could be done and yet preserve private insurance.
For example, tax funds might be contributed to a government-maintained
compensation fund in an amount reflecting vehicle and environmental
contribution to accidents. The relevant governmental unit would raise
207. Mr. David T. Skelton, a recent graduate of Indiana University School of Law
and a former administrator in the Indiana Department of Motor Vehicles, Financial Responsibility Section, has prepared two as yet unpublished papers in which a more detailed

modified merit rating formula is discussed. I am indebted to Mr. Skelton for his permission to make use of these manuscripts while preparing this article. I am even more
deeply in his debt for stimulating my interet in utilizing merit rating as one aspect of an
overall system of motor vehicular control. I have adopted Mr. Skelton's ideas for my
purposes, and he, of course, is not responsible for my modifications.
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these funds by a graduated income tax or a special tax assessment upon
land uses,"0 8 and vehicle manufacturers or sellers." 9 A percentage of each
victim's compensation benefits would be paid from the state operated
fund21 and the rest from a private insurer. The percentages of contribution would be determined annually, based upon the prior year's experience.
Alternatively, insurers could be reimbursed from tax-provided funds
every year in amounts corresponding to non-user caused accident benefits
paid. If private insurance were eliminated and governmental insurance
provided, it would still be both feasible and desirable to allocate funding
responsibility to all causally significant activities. Although some form
of tax would be used to raise the money for benefits, the tax rate
could be based upon causal contribution accidents. The tax as sanction is
not unknown. The educative and deterring values resulting from imposing
a sanction would thus be retained.
That aspect of the law of torts which utilized causal responsibility
as a way of allocating the responsibility to, provide compensation to
victims retains its vitality and usefulness in a modern society. The tort
remedy, which focused upon individual occurrences, is not a viable
instrument for allocating such responsibility in large numbers of incidents.
The tort remedy is also of limited usefulness whenever the allocation of
responsibility must be made among many causally responsible activities.
As this article demonstrates, the need to provide benefits to a large
number of victims does not require abandoning the sanctioning rationale
when allocating the responsibility to provide benefit funding. It is
possible to provide adequate levels of benefits to victims in a fairly and
efficiently administered claims system, and yet to retain the corrective
values achieved through identifying those activities responsible for producing accidents. Although many activities and conditions interact to
cause accidents, they can be identified. By using statistical methods and
208. The special assessment has been used for many years by local governmental
units to finance road repairs. The special assessment tax device could be used to force
land use contribution to roadway or intersection redesign, improved ingress and egress,
and the like, as an alternative to continued, annual contribution to the state compensation

fund.
209. A manufacturers or sellers tax would be easy to administer. The major difficulty would arise from the variable assessment based upon the statistical analysis of
vehicle contribution to accident incidence or severity. Initially the rating formula would
probably have to be established in a way to insure that only those costs clearly caused by
vehicular failures were used to levy the tax. Presumably as the statistical analysis became more sophisticated, it would be possible to refine the tax rating formula. It is
theoretically possible, though technically not yet feasible, to extend the taxing formula
to tire sellers and manufacturers, repair shoprs and the like.
210. Similar to New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnity Corporation, or
many state-run workmen's compensation second-injury funds.
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mpodern data processing equipment it is possible to obtain information
which will lead to a better allocation of resources to provide maximum
motoring safety for given levels of resources so allocated. Inevitably, such
a program will require greater governmental regulation of and control
over insurance. It probably will result in further regulation of many
activities not now being regulated for safety. It will also probably mean
that levels of taxation will be altered. When the social costs of so harmful
an activity as motoring are considered, the failure to take all feasible
steps to improve traffic safety appears irresponsible.

